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Introduction
Capacity analysis has been one of the most studied areas of fisheries economics over
the last ten years, with much of the research focusing on refining the myriad of defi-
nitions of fishing capacity and developing techniques for measuring capacity. A
great deal of intellectual effort has been devoted to these tasks, and much has been
achieved. The fisheries economics profession is now much better informed about the
complexities underlying indicators of capacity output, capacity utilisation, capital
stock, etc. There is broad international agreement on definitions of capacity,
achieved primarily as a result of workshops and meetings to develop and implement
the FAO International Plan of Action for the Management of Fishing Capacity
(IPOA) (Cunningham and Greboval 2001; Pascoe and Greboval 2003). Fisheries
managers at national and supranational (e.g., the European Union) levels are in-
creasingly adopting some of the concepts in the day-to-day management of fisheries
as they seek to match fishing effort with available resources.
However, it may be useful to reflect on a couple of issues regarding the increas-
ing popularity of capacity analysis and its relationship to both fisheries management
and the policy development process more generally. The first issue concerns what
has driven this (relative) explosion in capacity analysis. The second issue relates to
the extent to which capacity analysis is actually helping fisheries policy makers ad-
dress the right management questions.
What has Driven the Growth in Capacity Analysis?
The huge amount of intellectual energy that has been devoted to analysing capacity
seems to have been driven by two interrelated factors. First, there is no doubt that
for many in our profession, capacity analysis is technically interesting, intellectually
demanding, and offers exciting new avenues of research. This has gone hand in hand
with a rapid increase in computing power over the last ten years so that researchers
are now able to develop sophisticated and increasingly complex solutions to previ-
ously intractable problems. Advances in the theory and application of data
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envelopment analysis and the stochastic production frontier framework are particu-
larly striking in this regard (Kirkley, Morrison Paul, and Squires 2002).
A second driving factor has been demand from policy makers. The problems of
excess capacity and overcapitalisation in many of the world’s fisheries came to a
head in the mid-1990s and prompted a surge in demand for ways to measure the ex-
tent of the problem so that policy makers could develop policy responses. This was
manifested in the development of the Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries
and the IPOA at the international level, many provisions of which flowed into na-
tional policy regimes. In this environment, policy makers’ demands for information
both drove and were driven by advances in capacity analysis techniques such that
there developed a mutually reinforcing relationship between efforts to manage ca-
pacity and capacity analysis. Policy makers were increasingly able to get the sort of
fleet-level data that they felt was necessary to effectively manage capacity in their
fisheries, particularly given that many fisheries are managed through input controls.
In turn, researchers were encouraged to deepen and strengthen their analytical tech-
niques to measure capacity and predict the outcomes of various management
options. These two trends have been evident in the policy focus and research pro-
grams of many governments, particularly in Europe (through projects financed by
the European Commission; e.g., Hatcher and Robinson 1998) and the United States
(e.g., National Marine Fisheries Service 2001). While there is, undoubtedly, some-
thing of a “chicken and egg” issue concerning which is driving which, there seems
to be a growing symbiotic relationship between capacity analysis and fisheries man-
agement in a number of countries.
Focusing on the Right Management Questions?
One of the outcomes of this relationship has been an increasing preoccupation by
fisheries managers with trying to optimise fleet development, fleet structure, and
fleet reductions in the fisheries under their control. As the available technical tools
have improved, governments have increasingly sought to micro-manage the size and
structure of fishing fleets as they try to match the potential output of fleets with
available resource stocks. However, the notion that fisheries managers can consis-
tently and accurately predict the evolution of fleets and technological developments
over time, and efficiently manage entry and exit from the fleet, is largely illusory for
two reasons. First, the current techniques in capacity analysis do not capture the dy-
namic nature of fish stocks or fishers’ behaviour. Second, outside the fisheries
sector, it is widely recognised that there are inherent problems of government failure
in such undertakings as a result of asymmetric information and the principal-agent
problem (Weimer and Vining 2005). Yet within the fisheries sector, policy makers
persist with relatively narrowly framed responses to the market failure problems as-
sociated with exploitation of common property resources, and micro-managing
fishing fleets is an example of such a response.
It is questionable whether governments should, indeed, even be in the business
of determining the optimum development profile of fishing fleets, particularly when
the main policy tools available for doing so are relatively blunt command and con-
trol instruments of input controls and decommissioning schemes. Such top-down
approaches to managing fishing capacity are widespread. A prime example is the
European Union’s Multi-Annual Guidance Programmes (MAGP) for fleet reductions
which were implemented in the 1990s to achieve across-the-board fleet reductions
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having had only modest success, and the mechanics of EU fleet management were
altered in the 2002 reform of the Common Fisheries Policy, with more responsibility
placed on Member States for capacity management. Nevertheless, there remains a
heavy reliance on governments to adequately determine the optimal structure for
fishing fleets. For example, one of the objectives of a recent major European Com-
mission-funded project on capacity analysis was to identify the “balanced” or target
structure of the industry for a range of European countries (Vestergaard 2005).
To some degree, the improvements in capacity analysis have helped to perpetu-
ate an illusion of control by providing managers with a ready mechanism for
identifying how fleets can be grown, shrunk, or reconfigured to meet management
goals. As a result, in my opinion, it seems as though capacity analysis may be the
tail that is wagging the dog of fisheries policy by distracting fisheries policy makers
from the real problem that is driving excess capacity and its attendant consequences;
the lack of appropriate incentives for fishers.
Excess capacity is a symptom of poor fisheries management and degradation of
fish stocks, rather than the cause. The prescription for remedying the fundamental
problem is generally well understood, at least within the economics profession: clos-
ing the commons, appropriate specification of access rights, managing negative
externalities, stakeholder involvement in designing and implementing management
regulations, and effective enforcement of rights and regulations (Grafton et al.
2006). Fisheries policy makers would probably find their time better spent focussing
on developing fisheries management frameworks that altered the incentives facing
fishers, rather than on determining optimal fleet configurations. In particular, there
are property rights solutions to fisheries management problems that generally will
be more effective at ensuring that capacity matches the available resources. This
does not just refer to individual transferable quotas, which tend to be the immediate
corner to which many commentators turn when property rights are discussed. There
is, in fact, a wide range of economic instruments that will help fishers undertake the
kind of self-adjustment process that is better handled by market forces than by bu-
reaucratic fiat (e.g., individual transferable effort quotas, community quotas). It is
noteworthy that capacity analysis has not really figured in the research agendas of
those countries where property rights-based systems predominate (such as Iceland,
New Zealand, Australia).
One of the other major rationales underlying the extensive use of capacity
analysis in fleet management is to determine which vessels should be decommis-
sioned in the event of excess capacity, and what the structure of the remaining fleet
should look like. Decommissioning schemes are one of the major policy mecha-
nisms available to fisheries managers to try to reduce capacity and effort in
fisheries. However, it is widely recognised that most of the decommissioning
schemes that have been employed have not achieved their objectives (OECD 2006).
Once again, this is because the schemes are focused on addressing the symptom of
excess capacity, rather than the root cause of the problem. Where they have been in-
troduced as part of a package of management changes involving a fundamental shift
towards improved specification and enforcement of access rights, one-off decom-
missioning schemes have generally been effective as a kind of shock tactic to
correct previous poor policy choices, after which the capacity issue largely resolves
itself, if the ensuing policy framework is well constructed. But even here, there are
more efficient, market-oriented means of identifying which vessels should be de-
commissioned, rather than fisheries managers micro-managing the process.Cox 98
Conclusion
There is no doubt that capacity analysis has advanced our profession’s understand-
ing of the theoretical and empirical underpinnings of capacity management
challenges. In a policy environment largely dominated by the use of input controls
to manage fisheries, the data and insights generated by capacity analysis represent
valuable improvements in the information base available to managers. At the same
time, however, capacity analysis may have inadvertently encouraged fisheries man-
agers to focus on addressing the symptoms of the overexploitation in fisheries,
rather than the cause. While there is undoubtedly a role for capacity analysis, there
is also a pressing need to shift policy makers’ attention back to effectively managing
fisheries through improving the specification and enforcement of access rights. We
need to ensure that the dog is wagging the tail, rather than vice versa.
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